Secure Mining of Assocition Rulues over Horizontally Partioned Data in Data Mining by Rao, M.Mohan & Laxmaiah, Asst.professor  M.
Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology Vol. 10 Issue 14 (Ver. 1.0) November 2010 P a g e | 84
GJCST Classification 
Secure Mining of Assocition Rulues over 
Horizontally Partioned Data in Data Mining 
M.Mohan Rao ,Asst.professor1, M.Laxmaiah2 
Abstract-Data mining can extract important knowledge from 
large data collection. Sometimes these large collections are split 
among various parties, which can share the data. For example, 
insurance companies share the data from medical hospitals. 
Privacy concerns may prevent the parties from directly sharing 
the data. Here this project addresses secure mining of 
association rules over horizontally partitioned data. The 
existing work provides security by using some techniques like 
Randomization, Secure Multi Party computation, etc., The 
drawbacks in the existing work are inaccuracy, inefficiency 
and lacking of security. To overcome the drawbacks of existing 
system we proposed a new method by using Commutative 
Encryption tool, Randomization and  Secure multi party 
computation. This work also provides security for multiple 
numbers of sites. Examples include knowledge discovery 
among intelligence services of different countries and 
collaboration among corporations without revealing trade 
secrets.  
Keywords-Data Mining, Security, Privacy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Data mining technology has emerged as a means of 
identifying patterns and trends from large quantities of data. 
Data mining and data warehousing go hand-in-hand: Most 
tools operate by gathering all data into a central site, then 
running an algorithm against that data. However, privacy 
concerns can prevent building a centralized warehouse  
data may be distributed among several custodians, none of 
which are allowed to transfer their data to another site.This 
paper addresses the problem of computing association 
rules.The goal is to produce association rules that hold 
globally while limiting the information shared about each 
site. We can compute the global support and confidence of 
an association rule AB=>C knowing only the local supports 
of AB and ABC and size of each database. 
supportAB=>C      =       i=1
sites   support countABC(i)/    
i=1
sitesdatabase_size(i) 
supportAB     =      i=1
sites  support countAB(i)                                            
   / =1
sitesdatabase size(i) 
confidenceAB=>C  = supportAB=>C  /  supportAB 
1) Private Association Rule Mining Overview: 
Our method follows the two-phase approach described 
above, but combining locally generated rules and support 
counts is done by passing encrypted values between sites. 
The two phases are discovering candidate itemsets (those  
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that are frequent on one or more sites) and determining 
which of the candidate itemsets meet the global support/ 
confidence thresholds.The first phase (Fig. 1) uses 
commutative encryption. Each party encrypts its own 
frequent itemsets (e.g., Site 1 encrypts itemset C). The 
encrypted itemsets are then passed to other parties until all 
parties have encrypted all itemsets. These are passed to a 
common party to eliminate duplicates and to begin 
decryption. (In the figure, the full set of itemsets are shown 
to the left of Site 1, after Site 1 decrypts.) This set is then 
passed to each party and each party decrypts each itemset. 
The final result is the common itemsets (C and D in the 
figure).In the second phase (Fig. 2), each of the locally 
supported itemsets is tested to see if it is supported globally. 
In the figure, the itemset ABC is known to be supported at 
one or more sites and each computes their local support. The 
first site chooses a random value R and adds to R the 
amount by which its support for ABC exceeds the minimum 
support threshold. This value is passed to site 2, which adds 
the amount by which its support exceeds the threshold (note 
that this may be negative, as shown in the figure.) This is 
passed to site 3, which again adds its excess support. The 
resulting value (18) is tested using a secure comparison to 
see if it exceeds the Random value (17). If so, itemset ABC 
is supported globally. 
Fig. 1. Determining global candidate itemsets 
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Fig. 2. Determining if item set support exceeds 5 percent 
threshold 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
There are several fields where related work is occurring. We 
first describe other work in privacy-preserving data mining, 
then go into detail on specific background work on which 
this paper builds. Previous work in privacy-preserving data 
mining has addressed two issues. In one, the aim is 
preserving customer privacy by distorting the data values 
[2]. The idea is that the distorted data does not reveal private 
information and thus is s  afe‖ to use for mining. More 
recently, the data distortion approach has been applied to 
Boolean association rules. Again, the idea is to modify data 
values such that reconstruction of the values for any 
individual transaction is difficult, but the rules learned on 
the distorted data are still valid. One interesting feature of 
this work is a flexible definition of privacy, e.g., the ability 
to correctly guess a value of ―1‖ from the distorted data can 
be considered a greater threat to privacy than correctly 
learning a   0.‖The other approach uses cryptographic tools 
to build decision trees. In this work, the goal is to securely 
build an ID3 decision tree where the training set is 
distributed between two parties. The basic idea is that 
finding the attribute that maximizes information gain is 
equivalent to finding the attribute that minimizes the 
conditional entropy. The conditional entropy for an attribute 
for two parties can be written as a sum of the expression of 
the form (v1+ v2)*log(v1+v2). The authors give a way to 
securely calculate the expression (v1+v2)*log(v1+v2) and 
show how to use this function for building the ID3 securely. 
1) Mining of Association Rules 
The association rules mining problem can be defined as 
follows [1]: Let I ={ i1,i2, . . .,in} be a set of items. Let DB 
be a set of transactions where each transaction T is an 
itemset such that T  I. Given an itemset X I, a transaction 
T contains X if and only if X T. An association rule is an 
implication of the form X =>Y, where X I, Y  I, and 
X Y= . The rule X =>Y has support s in the transaction 
database DB if s% of transactions in DB contains X Y. 
The association rule holds in the transaction database DB 
with confidence c if c% of transactions in DB that contain X 
also contains Y. An itemset X with k items is called k-
itemset. The problem of mining association rules is to find 
all rules whose support and confidence are higher than 
certain user-specified minimum support and confidence. In 
this simplified definition of the association rules, missing 
items, negatives, and quantities are not considered. In this 
respect, transaction database DB can be seen as 0/1 matrix 
where each column is an item and each row is a transaction. 
In this paper, we use this view of association rules. 
2) Distributed Mining of Association Rules: 
The above problem of mining association rules can be 
extended to distributed environments. Let us assume that a 
transaction database DB is horizontally partitioned among n 
sites (namely, S1,S2, . . . , Sn) where DB = DB1  DB2 . . 
.  DBn and DBi resides at side Si(1<=I<=n). The itemset X 
has local support count of X.supi at site SI  if X.supI  of the 
transactions contains X. The global support count of X is 
given as X.sup = NI=1 X.supi. An itemset X is globally 
supported if X.sup>=s* NI=1 DBi . Global confidence of a 
rule X =>Y can be given as {X Y}.sup/X.sup.A fast 
algorithm for distributed association rule mining is given in 
Cheung et al. [1]. Their procedure for fast distributed mining 
of association rules (FDM) is summarized below: 
1) Candidate Sets Generation:  Generate candidate sets 
CGI(k) based on GLI(k-1), itemsets that are supported by the Si 
at the (k-1)th iteration, using the classic a priori candidate 
generation algorithm. Each site generates candidates based 
on the intersection of globally large (k- 1) itemsets and 
locally large (k- 1) itemsets. 
2) Local Pruning:  For each X CGI(k), scan the database 
DBi at Si to compute X:supi. If X is locally large Si, it is 
included in the LLi set. It is clear that if X is supported 
globally, it will be supported in one site. 
3) Support Count Exchange:  LLi(k)are broadcast and each 
site computes the local support for the items in ULLi(k).  
4) Broadcast Mining Results:  Each site broadcasts the 
local support for itemsets in ULLi(k). From this, each site is 
able to compute L(k). 
3) Secure Multiparty Computation: 
Substantial work has been done on secure multiparty 
computation. The key result is that a wide class of 
computations can be computed securely under reasonable 
assumptions. We give a brief overview of this work, 
concentrating on material that is used later in the paper. The 
definitions given here are from Goldreich. For simplicity, 
we concentrate on the two-party case. Extending the 
definitions to the multiparty case is straightforward.  
1) Security in Semihonest Model: 
A semihonest party follows the rules of the protocol using 
its correct input, but is free to later use what it sees during 
execution of the protocol to compromise security. This is 
somewhat realistic in the real world because parties who 
want to mine data for their mutual benefit will follow the 
protocol to get correct results. Also, a protocol that is buried 
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in large, complex software cannot be easily altered. A 
formal definition of private two-party computation in the 
semihonest model is defined. Computing a function 
privately is equivalent to computing it securely. 
2) Yao’s General Two-Party Secure Function Evaluation 
Yao‘s general secure two-party evaluation is based on 
expressing the function f(x,y) as a circuit and encrypting the 
gates for secure evaluation [3]. With this protocol, any two-
party function can be evaluated securely in the semihonest 
model. To be efficiently evaluated, however, the functions 
must have a small circuit representation. We will not give 
details of this generic method; however, we do use this  
generic result for securely finding whether a >=b (Yao‘s 
millionaire problem). For comparing any two integers 
securely, Yao‘s generic method is one of the most efficient 
methods known, although other asymptotically equivalent 
but  
practically more efficient algorithms could be used as well. 
3) Commutative Encryption 
Commutative encryption is an important tool that can be 
used in many privacy-preserving protocols. An encryption 
algorithm is commutative if the following two equations 
hold for any given feasible encryption keys k1, k2,... ., Kn  
K, any message M, and any permutations of i,j:       
        Eki1(…Ekin(M)…..)= Eji1(…Ejin(M)…..) 
 M1,M2  M such that M1  M2 and for                                                                          
given k, <1 2k 
Pr(Eki1(…Ekin(M)…..)= Eji1(…Ejin(M)…..))<  
 
These properties of commutative encryption can be used to 
check whether two items are equal without revealing them. 
For example, assume that party A has item iA and party B 
has item iB. To check if the items are equal, each party 
encrypts its item and sends it to the other party: In addition 
to meeting the above requirements, we require that the 
encryption be secure. Specifically, the encrypted values of a 
set of items should reveal no information about the items 
themselves. 
III. SECURE ASSOCIATION RULE MINING 
We will now use the tools described above to construct a 
distributed association rule mining algorithm that preserves 
the privacy of individual site results. The algorithm given is 
for three or more parties. 
4) Problem Definition 
Let i >=3 be the number of sites. Each site has a private 
transaction database DBi. We are given support threshold s 
and confidence c as percentages. The goal is to discover all 
association rules satisfying the thresholds, as defined in 
Section 2.1.1. We further desire that disclosure be limited: 
No site should be able to learn contents of a transaction at 
any other site, what rules are supported by any other site, or 
the  specific value of support/confidence for any rule at any 
other site unless that information is revealed by knowledge 
of one‘s own data and the final result. For example, if a rule 
is supported globally but not at one‘s own site, we can 
deduce that at least one other site supports the rule. Here, we 
assume no collusion. 
5) Method 
Our method follows the general approach of the FDM 
algorithm, with special protocols replacing the broadcasts of 
LLi(k)   and the support count of items LLi(k). We first give a 
method for finding the union of locally supported itemsets 
without revealing the originator of the particular itemset. We 
then provide  a method for securely testing if the support 
count exceeds the threshold. 
6) Secure Union of Locally Large Itemsets 
 In the FDM algorithm (Section 2.1.1), Step 3 reveals the 
large item sets supported by each site. To accomplish this 
without revealing what each site supports, we instead 
exchange locally large itemsets in a way that obscures the 
source of each itemset. We assume a secure commutative 
encryption algorithm with negligible collision probability 
The main idea is that each site encrypts the locally 
supported itemsets, along with enough fak  e‖ itemsets to 
hide the actual number supported. Each site then encrypts 
the itemsets from other sites. In Phases 2 and 3, the sets of 
encrypted itemsets are merged. Since (3) holds, duplicates in 
the locally supported itemsets will be duplicates in the 
encrypted itemsets and can be deleted. The reason this 
occurs in two phases is that if a site knows which fully 
encrypted itemsets come from which sites, it can compute 
the size of the intersection between any set of sites. While 
generally innocuous, if it has this information for itself, it 
can guess at the itemsets supported by other sites. Permuting 
the order after encryption in Phase 1 prevents knowing 
exactly which itemsets match; however, separately merging 
itemsets from odd and even sites in Phase 2 prevents any 
site from knowing the fully encrypted values of its own 
itemsets. Phase 4 decrypts the merged frequent itemsets. 
Commutativity of encryption allows us to decrypt all 
itemsets in the same order regardless of the order they were 
encrypted in, preventing sites from tracking the source of 
each itemset. The detailed algorithm is given in Protocol 1 
(see Fig. 3). 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Naturally, ever increasing data collection, along with the 
influx of analysis tools capable of handling huge volumes of 
information, has led to privacy concerns. The cryptographic 
community has formally defined much stronger notions of 
privacy. Also cryptography tools can enable data mining 
that would otherwise be prevented due to security concerns. 
We have given procedures to mine distributed association 
rules on horizontally partitioned data. We have shown that 
distributed association rule mining can be done efficiently 
under reasonable security assumptions. We believe the need 
for mining of data where access is restricted by privacy 
concerns will increase. Examples include knowledge 
discovery among intelligence services of different countries 
and collaboration among corporations without revealing 
trade secrets. Even within a single multinational company, 
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privacy laws in different jurisdictions may prevent sharing
individual data.  Allowing error in the results may enable 
more efficient algorithms that maintain the desired level of
security. Continued research will expand the scope of
privacy-preserving data mining, enabling most or all data
mining methods applied in situations where privacy
concerns would appear to restrict such mining. 
Protocol 1 Finding secure union of large itemsets of size k 
Require: N= 3 sites numbered 1…..N1, set F of
nonitemsets 
Phase 0: Encryption of all the rules by all sites 
for each site i do 
generate LLi(k) as in steps 1 and 2 of the FDM algorithm 
LLei(k) = ø; 
for each X € LLi(k) do 
LLei(k) = LLei(k) U{Ei(X)} 
end for 
for j = |LLei(k)| + 1 to |CG(k)| do 
LLei(k) = LLei(k) [ {Ei(random selection from F)} 
end for 
end for 
Phase 1: Encryption by all sites 
for Round j = 0 to N − 1 do 
if Round j= 0 then 
Each site i sends permuted LLei(k) to site (i+1) mod 
N 
else 
Each site i encrypts all items in LLe(i−j mod N)(k) 
with Ei, permutes, and sends it to site (i+1) mod N 
end if 
end for{At the end of Phase 1, site i has the itemsets of 
site (i + 1) mod N encrypted by every site} 
Phase 2: Merge odd/even itemsets 
Each site i sends LLei+1 mod N to site i mod 2
Site 0 sets RuleSet1 = [d(N−1)/2e 
j=1 LLe(2j−1)(k) 
Site 1 sets RuleSet0 = [b(N−1)/2c 
j=0 LLe(2j)(k) 
Phase 3: Merge all itemsets 
Site 1 sends permuted RuleSet1 to site 0 
Site 0 sets RuleSet = RuleSet0 U RuleSet1 
Phase 4: Decryption 
for i = 0 to N − 1 do 
Site i decrypts items in RuleSet using Di 
Site i sends permuted RuleSet to site i + 1 mod N 
end for 
Site N  1 decrypts items in RuleSet using DN1
RuleSet(k) = RuleSet F 
Site N  1 broadcasts RuleSet(k) to sites 0..N 2 
Fig. 3. Protocol 1: Finding secure union of large itemsets of
size k. 
3.3 Algorithm to Calculate Global Support 
Step 1 Calculate s for the data item whose support count is
to be calculated  
Step 2 Calculate d 
Step 3 choose r such that 0<r<d 
Step 4 calculate a = d/k 
Step 5 Calculate t= r+a 
Step 6 if s>t then the data item is public
Else the data item is private 
Thus the global support is calculated and the
secret and the non secret data  are thus
separated. 
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